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ABSTRACT. Recent state and municipal budget crises have generated a great deal of
consternation among market participants and policymakers; they have also led scholars to debate
the merits of bailouts or other forms of debt relief. This Essay considers why the mechanisms
that were supposed to control state and local fiscal behavior ex ante have not worked. In the
aftermath of the state and municipal debt crises of the nineteenth century, states adopted a series
of constitutional reforms intended to constrain state and local fiscal behavior. In addition, the
debt markets and the Tieboutian market in jurisdictions should theoretically prevent states and
municipalities from overspending. Neither the fiscal constitution in the states nor the markets
have prevented state and local fiscal difficulties, however; indeed, they have arguably contributed
to those difficulties. Nevertheless, much of the current debate over bailouts and state bankruptcy
reprises the longstanding skepticism of ordinary state and local political processes. This Essay
argues that this distrust of local democratic decisionmaking is unwarranted, that efforts to
constrain fiscal politics are destined to fail, and that the solution to state and local fiscal crises is
largely a matter of politics and not a matter of institutional design.
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INTRODUCTION
Debt crises loom large throughout the world. This Essay examines a
particular subset of government debtors: states and localities. As legislatures
across the country wrestle with multibillion-dollar budget deficits, the
possibility of state or municipal defaults has preoccupied officials and
frightened investors.! Several cities have filed for bankruptcy in the last year,
and some scholars have advocated that states also be permitted to declare
bankruptcy.' The fiscal health of states and cities has become a central concern
of policymakers.
Recent debates about local and state fiscal health have been surprisingly
ahistorical, however. Even if the current budget crises are more consequential
than what occurs in normal economic downturns (and there is some doubt that
they are) ,4 we have been here before. In the nineteenth century, state and
municipal debt crises were quite real. Public overinvestment in infrastructure
(especially railroads) and a series of economic shocks precipitated state and
1. See, e.g., Editorial, A Growing Gloom for States and Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2oll/o8/14/opinion/sunday/a-growing-gloom-for-states-and-cities.html;
Charles Riley, Muni Bond Fears Run Wild, CNNMONEY, Jan. 14, 2011, http://money.cnn.com/
20 i1/ol/14/narkets/bondcenter/municipal bonds/index.htm; Jake Zamansky, Should Investors Be
Concerned About Their Muni Bond Portfolios?, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 24, 2011),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/248279-should-investors-be-concerned-about-their-muni-bond
-portfolios ("Investors are scared, and have withdrawn more than $22 billion from muni
bond mutual funds since the end of October."); 6o Minutes: State Budgets: Day of Reckoning
(CBS television broadcast Dec. 19, 2010), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/
watch/?id=7 16629 3 n.
2. As of this writing, four general purpose local governments have filed for bankruptcy in 2011:
Jefferson County, Alabama; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Central Falls, Rhode Island; and Boise
County, Idaho. Kelly Nolan, Largest Municipal Bankruptcy Filed, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2011,
http://online.wsj.conVartidcle/SBlooo424o529702o42 2 4 60 4 57 70284 9 1526654090.html. Harrisburg's
petition was recently rejected by a federal bankruptcy court on the grounds that the city
council was not authorized to file. See Sabrina Tavernise, Judge Rejects Harrisburg's
Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.coM/2o11/11/24/us/harrisburgs-
bankruptcy-filing-is-rejected-by-judge.html.
3. See, e.g., David Skeel, Give States a Way To Go Bankrupt: It's the Best Option for Avoiding a
Massive Federal Bailout, WKLY. STANDARD, NOV. 29, 2010, http://www.weeldystandard.com/
articles/give-states-way-go-bankrupt 518378.html [hereinafter Skeel, Give States a Way To
Go Bankrupt]; David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11-24, 2011), http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1907774 [hereinafter Skeel, States of Bankruptcy]. For an opposing view, see E.J.
McMahon, State Bankruptcy Is a Bad Idea, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2011, http://online
.wsj.com/article/SB10001424o527487o48813o4576o94o91992370356.html.
4. See Iris J. Lay, Unbreakable Bonds, N.Y. TIMrs, Mar. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.cof/2o11/




local fiscal failures. In 1841 and 1842, nine states defaulted on their obligations,
and hundreds of municipalities defaulted throughout the second half of the
century.' Public services were reduced and infrastructure projects had to be
scuttled, state and municipal property had to be sold off, and in some cases
bondholders never got paid. The political response was equally swift: in an
effort to rein in wayward legislatures and city councils, states embraced
constitutional debt limitations, balanced budget mandates, public-purpose
requirements, and other restrictions on debt and spending. The nineteenth
century witnessed the rise of the "fiscal constitution" in the states.'
We have not yet approached anything like the default rate of the nineteenth
century. Nevertheless, the recurrence of state and local budget crises suggests
that the fiscal constitution and other mechanisms that purport to discipline
state and municipal finances have not achieved their aims. In this Essay, I offer
reasons why. I argue that efforts to constrain states and municipalities in the
name of good fiscal policy have often led to poor fiscal policy and that the
discipline provided by the debt markets is at best partial and at worst
counterproductive. More broadly, I question whether the goal of "fiscal
discipline" is itself achievable. Even the most sensible, honest, and scrupulous
state or local government cannot avoid the business cycle, the reality of
economic boom and bust. Efforts to discipline states and local governments
assume that profligacy is their central problem and that some external coercive
force is necessary to restrain them. I argue against this view.
This Essay has three parts. Part I describes two potential mechanisms of
fiscal discipline - the fiscal constitution and the market - and shows how both
are informed by the assumption that the problem of municipal and state debt is
a problem of overspending. Part II explains why neither mechanism can
succeed. As for the fiscal constitution, it severely limits the ability of states and
localities to respond to economic downturns,7 leads governments to adopt
indirect and inefficient means of funding services, and fails to depoliticize
budgetary decisions, instead merely shifting ideological fights to the courts or
5. see RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAw 817 (7th ed. 2009); ERIC H. MONKKONEN, THE LOCAL STATE: PUBLIC
MONEY AND AMERICAN CITIES 25-26 (1995). Monkkonen reports that there were
approximately 941 municipal bond defaults between 1854 and 1929, with a peak of ill in
1898. Bond defaults rose by orders of magnitude during the Great Depression, peaking in
1935 with 3251 defaults. See MONKKONEN, supra.
6. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2544, 2549 & n.21 (2005);
see Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State
Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 911-12 (2003).
7. Super, supra note 6, at 2609-11.
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to other political arenas. As for the market, it tends to reflect the underlying
business cycle. In good times, states and localities are encouraged to take on
debt. In bad times, greatly needed financing becomes unavailable.
Furthermore, though cities and states may be inclined to follow market signals,
they often have limited room to maneuver: their hands are tied by
macroeconomic and constitutional constraints. The relative impotence of states
and cities suggests that the problem of profligacy is itself a misdiagnosis.
Indeed, government spending may be exactly what is needed in a downturn,
but both market forces and constitutional constraints require states and
municipalities to adopt procyclical policies that undermine fiscal stability and
economic growth.'
Part III considers proposals for state bankruptcy and describes how they
reprise the nineteenth-century effort to overcome the deficiencies of state
politics by shifting power away from elected officials. The bankruptcy option is
animated by a concern with bailouts and more specifically by a fear of moral
hazard. But I argue that moral hazard concerns are overstated. In part, that is
because territorially defined, subnational polities are much less responsive to
incentives - whether those incentives encourage or discourage profligacy - than
designers of institutions sometimes think. That does not mean that states and
cities are inevitably badly managed -in fact, the opposite is generally true.' It
does mean, however, that central governments have a role to play in stabilizing
local finances. This suggests that the solution to state and local fiscal crises is
largely a matter of politics and not a matter of institutional design.
The political solution to fiscal crisis is complicated, however, for it
implicates deeper questions about the relationship between democracy and
debt. Debt raises two central difficulties for democratic theory. First, there is
the problem of intergenerational equity. Efforts by the current polity to
undertake significant financial commitments that bind future polities are
troubling. But permitting the future to exercise a veto over present-day tax and
spending decisions is also problematic. Indeed, it may be perfectly just and fair
for future polities to help pay for long-term investments. Second, there is the
problem of governance by capital markets. As David Hume so famously
recognized, public debt cedes power to an unaccountable class of financiers,
subordinates the citizens' welfare to the creditors', and undermines the
independence of the state."o Debt is inconsistent with popular sovereignty to
8. David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem,
98 CALF. L. REV. 749, 766-69 (2010).
9. See discussion infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.




the extent that it allows capital markets to dictate the internal politics of cities
and states and to limit their present range of policy choices.
I highlight these tensions not because I can resolve them here but because
they suggest why constraining democratic majorities in the name of fiscal
discipline is and should be troubling. These tensions have emerged with great
force as governments and their citizens throughout the world wrestle with debt
crises and austerity reforms in the aftermath of the recent recession."
Imminent defaults by member states have induced the European Union to
offer bailouts to some nations and contemplate the possibility of additional
assistance for others." In the United States, the raising of the country's debt
limit and the downgrading of its long-term debt generated a political
maelstrom. 13
Sovereign nations that control their own monetary policy are situated
differently from states and localities, which do not have such macroeconomic
policy tools at their disposal. Nevertheless, the constitutional setting in which
state and local fiscal decisionmaking takes place is relevant to sovereign debt
crises, for state and local governments have operated under constitutionalized
debt and spending limits for some time. That these governments continue to
face debt crises is a lesson about the limits of constitutions. That these
governments have nevertheless often met their fiscal obligations suggests that
our abiding skepticism of local political processes is unwarranted.
1. DEBT AND DISCIPLINE
Scholars and policymakers tend to emphasize two structural mechanisms
for controlling local fiscal behavior: constitutional constraints and markets.
State and local governments act against the backdrop of some combination of
the two. Of course, representative democracy- citizens' power to elect fiscally
prudent agents and decline to elect fiscally imprudent ones -is the chief way to
n1. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes & Carl Hulse, As the Federal Government Hits Its Debt Limit,
Lawmakers Spar over Solution, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2oil/o5/
17/us/politic/17budget.html; Anthee Carassava, Greek Farmers Clash with Riot Police, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo9/o2/o3/world/Europe/o3greece.html.
12. Stephen Castle & Jack Ewing, Europe Unifies To Assist Greece with Line ofAid, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2olo/o4/12/business/global/l2drachma.html.
13. Binyamin Appelbaum & Eric Dash, S.& P. Downgrades Debt Rating of U.S. for First Time,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2oil/o8/o6/business/us-debt-downgraded
-by-sp.html; Eric Dash, House Panel Plans To Question Rating Agencies over Downgrade Threat
to U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, July 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/o7/27/business/economy/
credit-rating-agencies-to-testify-before-congress.html.
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control local fiscal behavior. But since the nineteenth century, one of the
central assumptions about the problem of state and municipal fiscal policy has
been that democracy-at least in its majoritarian and representative forms-is a
failure. 14
I will say more about that assumption below, but for now it is enough to
point out that constitutional constraints are, by definition, limits on the regular
representative political process. The fiscal constitution in the states is a product
of a nineteenth-century reaction to state and municipal debt and a twentieth-
century movement to restrict taxation. These two movements led to state
constitutional constraints designed to limit fiscal flexibility. Forty-one state
constitutions include balanced budget requirements."s Forty-six states mandate
the use of public monies only for public purposes.' 6 And three-quarters of the
states limit the ability of state and local governments to acquire debt." Many
states also have tax uniformity requirements intended to prevent subsidies
through selective exemptions.' Over thirty states have some combination of
constitutional or statutory tax and expenditure limitations (TELs)," which can
require a legislative supermajority, or a supermajority combined with a public
referendum, to approve some or all new tax proposals.2 o Moreover, at least
forty-three states limit local governments by placing some restrictions on local
property taxation." All these fiscal constraints have been justified as
responding to a perceived problem of overspending.
We should be clear about the nature of that problem, however. One
possibility is that public officials are engaged in profligate spending in
contravention of the public interest because those officials are either corrupt or
14. See FREDERIC C. HowE, THE CITY: THE HOPE OF DEMOCRACY 1-8 (1905) (describing and
criticizing this view).
15. NCSL Fiscal Brief. State Balanced Budget Provisions, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES 3
(Oct. 201o), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions201o.pdf.
Forty-one states either have constitutional or statutory requirements that the legislature pass
a balanced budget. Other definitions, such as the requirement that the governor submit a
balanced budget to the legislature, lead to a different total number of state provisions. Id.
16. Dale F. Rubin, Constitutional Aid Limitation Provisions and the Public Purpose Doctrine, 12 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 143, 143 n.1 (1993).
17. Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness
of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1301, 1315.
i8. Id. at 1318-19; see BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, at 667-68.
19. Bert Waisanen, State Tax and Expenditure Limits-2oo8, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (2008), http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?Tabid=12633.
2o. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, at 700.




beholden to special interests. The main mission of nineteenth-century
reformers was to eliminate subsidies to private enterprise-a goal consistent
with classical jurisprudence's concern with economic favoritism." Another
possibility is that public officials are spending exactly as a majority of their
constituents want but that current residents are foisting costs on future
residents. This problem of shortsightedness is one that nineteenth-century
reformers also sought to correct. A final problem is that local tax and spending
decisions might negatively affect outsiders -either neighboring jurisdictions or
the state or country as a whole. At the turn of the twenty-first century, we
worry about fiscal externalities and, more recently, the possibility of
contagion -the potential knock-on effects of a default by a state or a large city.
These are common agency or externality problems, and reformers have
long debated how to solve them. Entrenching debt limits in constitutions,
limiting the uses to which public monies could be put, and giving courts the
role of enforcers were the nineteenth-century solutions. Limiting legislative
authority to tax and spend by requiring extraordinary popular consent was the
twentieth-century solution.
The second structural solution to this problem of fiscal discipline is the
market-either the credit markets or the Tieboutian market in jurisdictions. As
to the first, scholars have argued that borrowing costs will create strong
incentives for states and localities to exercise fiscal judgment." Assuming that
credit rating agencies or the market as a whole can generate accurate
predictions (and after the recent failures of rating agencies to correctly assess
risk,' one might have doubts about that), creditors -and more generally, the
bond market-ensure that states and localities will make appropriate fiscal
22. Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of
the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, go IOWAL. REv. 1011, 1030-37 (2005).
23. See Tamim Bayoumi, Morris Goldstein & Geoffrey Woglom, Do Credit Markets Discipline
Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from U.S. States, 27 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 1046, 1046,
1057 (1995); cf D. Roderick Kiewiet & Kristin Szakaly, Constitutional Limitations on
Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness, 12 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 62, 66 (1996) ("[I]t
is the discipline of the credit market that is the real constraint on issuing debt, not the state
constitution."); Clayton P. Gillette, Political Will and Fiscal Federalism in Municipal Bankruptcy
11 n.26 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 262, 2011), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1793173 ("[A]ny locality refusing to make payments would have difficulty in
subsequent borrowings.").
24. Emily Donahue, SEC Report and Recent Class Action Spell Trouble for Rating Agencies, Am.
BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 12, 2008, at 67 ("Based on the changes the agencies made to their
rating methodologies in 2007, it appears that the agencies did not take into account
significant differences between the subprime mortgages flooding the market and the
traditional mortgages that accounted for most of the historical data relied upon in
generating the ratings.").
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choices." On this account, the fiscal constitution is a way for governments to
credibly commit to exercise fiscal constraint. It is a means of lowering the
current cost of credit by limiting the jurisdiction's future borrowing and
spending power.
The Tieboutian market works somewhat differently. The incentive for a
jurisdiction to be fiscally responsible does not come from capital, but rather
from residents and firms through their decisions about where to locate. To the
extent that those residents and firms have sufficient information, they will
choose jurisdictions that are fiscally sound while punishing (by exiting) those
jurisdictions that are overextended. If a state or city wants to win in the
jurisdictional competition, it must operate efficiently by providing good
services at low cost." Thus, fiscal federalism produces a race to the top:
Tieboutian government markets lead to good fiscal outcomes."
Of course, these market mechanisms sit uneasily alongside the fiscal
constitution. One does not need the fiscal constitution if either the credit or the
intergovernmental market is itself sufficient to impose fiscal discipline on states
and local governments. Nevertheless, the fiscal constitution may be a way of
signaling a polity's pre-commitment to discipline, especially if the polity has a
limited track record.
Finally, the discipline of the market only works if states and localities can
and do internalize the costs and benefits of their fiscal decisions. If a locality's
fiscal health is mostly a function of circumstances beyond its control or if locals
can depend on higher-level governments for aid, then market discipline will
have little effect. Fiscal federalists therefore disfavor bailouts.
II. THE FAILURE OF CONSTRAINTS
One might expect that the fiscal constitution and the market together
should be sufficient to limit fiscal crises in the states. But it turns out that these
two mechanisms often work at cross-purposes. As for constitutional
25. A more general claim is that creditors enhance democratic decisionmaking by forcing states
to adopt political reforms that contribute to the transparency, accountability, and
responsiveness of government. The strongest form of this argument asserts that the
development of western-style representative democracy is in part attributable to creditor
demands for institutions that are stable and representative. See Clayton P. Gillette, Can
Public Debt Enhance Democracy?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 937, 941 (2008). These are
complex historical claims and depend in part on explaining why credit was extended for so
long to monarchs and why capital continues to flow to dictatorial regimes.
26. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcON. 416 (1956).




constraints, scholars increasingly argue that they are generally a bad idea -that
the cure of the fiscal constitution has often been worse than the disease of
overspending." As for the market, the discipline it offers is misplaced. Market
signals are often mistimed, and the mechanism for translating bad credit into
political cost is highly imperfect. More importantly, the market provides no
answers for the cities and states that face fiscal difficulties because of the
restructuring of regional and global economies. These issues are related, as the
chief concern for states and localities is the same as it has been since the
nineteenth century and before: managing boom and bust.
The chief drawback of constitutionalization is that it severely limits the
ability of states and localities to respond to changes in economic circumstances.
As already noted, the fiscal constitution in many states is a product of a
nineteenth-century aversion to debt and a twentieth-century aversion to taxes.
This anti-debt and anti-tax fiscal structure sharply constrains the ways in
which states and localities can raise and spend monies. It can have pernicious
consequences, for states and localities have to fund their services and they will
often find indirect ways to do so.
For example, states facing balanced budget requirements will seek to move
as much spending "off-budget" as possible. The balanced budget requirement
creates an incentive to put off costs or use accounting strategies to hide
overruns.2 ' The underfunding of state employee pension funds, one of the
chief problems animating the current crisis, is one of these strategies.3o
Constitutional or statutory rainy day fund requirements are subject to similar
manipulation." Consider also that in states with local property-tax ceilings,
cities compete for sales-tax-generating businesses and try to avoid housing.
This "fiscalization of land use" induces local governments to zone in ways that
distort regional property markets and generate high costs in terms of sprawl
28. Susan P. Fino, A Cure Worse than the Disease? Taxation and Finance Provisions in State
Constitutions, 34 RUTGERs L.J. 959, 959-60 (2003).
29. Some accounting organizations have made proposals for a uniform accounting procedure
that governments can use that will paint a more accurate picture of state and local public
finances. Mary Williams Walsh, A Proposal for Drawing a Clearer Picture of Public Pension
Finances, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.conm/2oil/o7/o3/business/proposal
-hopes-to-improve-disclosures-on-public-pensions.html.
30. See, e.g., Karen Paget, The Balanced Budget Trap, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 1, 1996, http://prospect
.org/cs/articles?article=the balanced budget-trap ("Even in states with strict provisions or a
political culture that strongly supports budget balance, a plethora of accounting gimmicks
have been devised to reconcile flexibility with nominal budget balance. These include . ..
underfunding public employee pension funds.. . .
31. Gamage, supra note 8, at 765-68.
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and the unequal provision of local public services." Cities also increasingly
depend on fees, intergovernmental transfers, or public-private schemes like
tax-increment financing as a means of providing public services. And taxation
limitations force states and localities to depend to a greater degree on debt
financing-an irony in light of constitutional debt limitations. Meanwhile,
those limitations induce states and cities to rely more heavily on special
purpose districts or authorities that can issue debt outside of formal
constitutional constraints. This "non-debt" debt is often more expensive."
Courts have taken a realist position when it comes to the fiscal constitution,
often reading constitutional restraints narrowly in order to allow the
government to function, though not so narrowly as to obviate legislatures'
need to think creatively. The result has been the judicialization of debt in some
states (with judges making distinctions between "good" debt and "bad" debt),
the routine avoidance of constitutional debt limitations, and the rise of new
(and not always sensible) financing mechanisms.14 Legislatures generally
endorse these avoidance mechanisms through regular legislation or by
constitutionally entrenching exceptions.s
Fiscal politics is thus state constitutional politics -oftentimes with a
supermajority requirement, which gives minority interests effective vetoes.
And, as interest groups well know, one can entrench both spending restrictions
and spending commitments. Some states have constitutionalized their pension
commitments or their education spending levels, for instance. 6 Especially in
states with a robust initiative process, taxing restrictions coexist with spending
requirements, thus limiting the range of revenue and spending options
available to legislators. Plebiscitarian or supermajoritarian processes exacerbate
that difficulty and are subject to all the usual critiques of such processes." Of
course, the purpose of constitutional entrenchment is to raise barriers to state
32. Jonathan Schwartz, Note, Prisoners of Proposition 13: Sales Taxes, Property Taxes, and the
Fiscalization ofMunicipal Land Use Decisions, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 183, 201-04 (1997).
33. Briffault, supra note 6, at 919-20, 925-27.
34. Id. at 910-27-
35. For instance, although the Alabama Constitution bars state debt, it contains numerous
amendments allowing the legislature to issue bonds for specific projects. See James H.
White, III, Constitutional Authority To Issue Debt, 33 CUMB. L. REV. 561, 565-67 (2003).
36. California is one state that has constitutionalized education spending. CAL. CONST. art. IX,
§ 6. For constitutional commitments regarding retirement plans, see Amy B. Monahan,
Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, S EDUC. FIN. & POL'Y 617, 638-39 (2010).
37. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L.





and local fiscal decisionmaking. The result, however, has often been
constrained or distorted budget processes and perennial budget conflict-with
no concomitant increase in fiscal discipline.
Does the market work better? Certainly, the participants in the credit
markets are capable of making sensible distinctions among government
debtors. Thus, bond analysts know that the limits imposed by constitutional
debt restrictions are not as important as tax limitations -the revenue-raising
capacity of the entity issuing the debt. Moreover, cities and states obviously
pay attention to market signals; they are justifiably wary of a poor credit rating.
There is no question that the market "works" insofar as it induces the attention
of state and local officials.
Nevertheless, the bond market is a fairly crude instrument for enforcing
fiscal discipline. It is important to remember that the makers of the market-
underwriters, banks, bond counsel, brokers-have an interest in promoting
borrowing, especially in economically flush times. 9 And though the myth of
perfect markets continues to hold sway in some quarters, it is fairly evident
from the recent global downturn that markets do not price in all possible
eventualities. By the time the bond market responds to an economic shock, it
may be too late. Cities and states will have already taken on significant debt.
The short-term interests of market makers may also explain why cities and
states can often return to the credit markets even after a default.4o
But let us assume that the debt markets are not exploitative and that debt
can be priced correctly. Even under those circumstances, it is far from clear that
states or local governments can take any particular action in response to those
prices. This is so for a number of reasons. First, as noted already,
constitutionalized fiscal limits often restrict the ability of states and localities to
make adjustments on the revenue side. Another way to say this is that the fiscal
constitution creates only a partial fiscal federalism. In particular, localities
38. California is the poster child for these failures. See JOE MATHEWS & MARE PAUL, CALIFORNIA
CRACKUP: HOw REFORM BROKE THE GOLDEN STATE AND How WE CAN Fix IT (2010). For
discussion of the failures of state debt limitations, see Kiewiet & Szakaly, supra note 23, at
66-71. For discussion of the failures of state balanced budget amendments, see RICHARD
BRIFFAULT, BALANCING ACTS: THE REALITY BEHIND STATE BALANCED BUDGET
REQUIREMENTs 63-65 (1996).
39. Thanks to Richard Briffault for this observation. For discussion of problems in the municipal
debt markets, see, for example, Gretchen Morgenson, Wall Street's Tax on Main Street, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2oll/o8/o7/business/wall-streets-tax-on-main
-street.html; and Kelly Shea, Transparency Problems in the Municipal Debt Markets and Their
Effect on Fiscal Condition, PUB. PURPOSE, Spring 201o, at 1, 14-20, http://www.american.edu/
spa/publicpurpose/upload/Transparency-Problems-in-the-Municipal.pdf.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 55-58.
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cannot tax and spend as they wish; the fiscal constitution means that options
that would otherwise be open to them (such as raising taxes) often are not."1 If
the revenue side is closed to them -as it is in states with significant restrictions
on local taxation for instance -governments are not capable of making the full
range of tax and spending decisions. It is for this reason that some scholars
have criticized constitutional limitations on local taxation.42
Second, the discipline of the market can only work if local tax and spending
policies can affect or at least anticipate changes in macroeconomic conditions.
The theory of market discipline assumes that states and localities have some
ability to influence or manage economic growth and decline." But this
assumption is not well founded. As an initial matter, developmental
economists are not confident that they know what induces growth or what
factors precipitate decline. 4 And economic geographers have argued that
economic development has more to do with the happenstance of initial
settlement decisions and path dependency than with capital-favorable
policies. 45 On this account, local fiscal discipline is only tangentially related to
overall economic health.4*
On the ground, postindustrial cities and states are wrestling with economic
restructuring, as production has shifted away from formerly prosperous cities,
regions, and nations. The processes of deindustrialization, suburbanization,
and globalization operate on a large scale and are relatively immune to local
influence. Meanwhile, the burgeoning costs of healthcare and education-
which combined make up half of state budgets and a third of local budgets -
are also difficult for states and localities to manage or reduce.47
More importantly, boom and bust cycles continue to be features of modern
economies. Those cycles unsurprisingly produce both business and government
failures. Meanwhile, the fiscal constitution requires state and local budgets to
41. See GERALD 1. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: How STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION
75-98 (20o8); Gillette, supra note 27, at 1243-44.
42. See Gillette, supra note 27.
43. See Richard C. Schragger, Decentralization and Development, 96 VA. L. REV. 1837 (2010).
44. For a discussion of this literature, see id. at 1879-81.
45. Id. at 1891-93.
46. HELEN F. LADD & JOHN YINGER, AMERICA'S AILING CITIES: FISCAL HEALTH AND THE DESIGN
OF URBAN PoucY 291 (1989) ("As we measure it, a city's fiscal health, standardized or
actual, depends on economic, social, and institutional factors that are largely outside the
city's control.").
47. See Iris J. Lay & Elizabeth McNichol, Misunderstandings Regarding State Debt, Pensions, and
Retiree Health Costs Create Unnecessary Alarm, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES 19-20




be tightened in recessions - the very opposite of what a countercyclical economic
strategy demands. The result is that state fiscal policy exacerbates downturns
while cutting services to the most vulnerable."' Scholars have suggested federal
intervention to stabilize local budgets as a second-best solution to this
problem." Others have argued for a wholesale rethinking of state fiscal
constitutions.so
Policy and constitutional reforms may give cities and states the capacity to
respond more readily to market signals, but they do not address whether
governments will or should do so. Market discipline is often assumed to
produce certain (positive) government behaviors. But there is no reason to
believe that interjurisdictional competition races or the pressure of the debt
market will induce governments to adopt any particular spending and debt
policies.
Consider interjurisdictional competition first. As many theorists have
pointed out, the assumptions of the Tiebout model, especially its reliance on
perfect mobility, are unrealistic." There are very few jurisdictional settings that
can meet those requirements.
But even assuming an idealized model, Hongbin Cai and Daniel Treisman
have shown that competition will not necessarily produce fiscally disciplined
developmental policies.s2 They argue that jurisdictions that are initially behind
in the race for mobile capital may not be induced to adopt such policies
without a guarantee that the capital will remain in the jurisdiction.s" Indeed,
those jurisdictions that are behind should rationally favor policies that
redistribute to current residents or firms. Cai and Treisman's conclusion is that
under conditions of initial jurisdictional heterogeneity, interjurisdictional
competition does not generate non-redistributive fiscal policies at all. Poorer
jurisdictions give up in the interjurisdictional race for capital while richer
jurisdictions continue to invest. This model may partially explain the
continuing divergence between rich and poor places, that is, why economic
48. See Super, supra note 6.
49- See, e.g., Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The Alternative
Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REv. 187 (2010).
50. See Super, supra note 6.
51. See, e.g., John D. Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America's
Devolution Debate, ii J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 77 (1997) (noting that interstate migration is less
than 3% per year, and that individuals move for reasons not related to the performance of
current officeholders).
52. Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments?
Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy, 95 AM. EcoN. REv. 817, 825-28 (2005).
53. Id.
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development tends to occur where development already exists. Rich
jurisdictions get richer, pulling capital out of poorer jurisdictions, when
neoclassical economics would otherwise predict convergence.'
By contrast, the pressure of the debt market is real: borrowing costs do
increase as debt levels rise." But as I have already noted, the reputational
sanction for failing to pay is surprisingly muted. Commentators have observed
that creditors do not penalize defaulting governments with much stringency. 6
Indeed, states that only partially repaid or never repaid their mid-nineteenth-
century debts were still able to borrow at relatively reasonable rates ten to
fifteen years later.s7 This raises the puzzle of why governments repay their
debts at all. The evidence shows that they do, often by taking quite heroic
measures. 5
Scholars writing about sovereign debt have offered a number of theories for
why this is so.59 Part of the challenge is determining how fiscal costs are (or,
more pointedly, are not) translated into political ones. One possibility is that
creditors participate directly in the policymaking process. No doubt large
debtholders have an interest in a jurisdiction's long-term budget decisions and
may seek to influence policymakers, for better or for worse.6 o In mature credit
markets, however, bondholders are more likely to express their preferences
through their buy and sell orders, not through politics.
Thus, when scholars argue that creditors influence policy, they mostly
mean that the price of debt influences policy. For the market to provide
discipline, however, we must assume that state and local officials will pay a
political price as debt service or the heightened cost of borrowing eat into the
54. Id. at 828 ("Better-endowed units compete aggressively and drain capital from their poorly
endowed counterparts. Poorly endowed units, knowing they will lose, simply give up.").
55. See Bayoumi et al., supra note 23, at 1057.
56. See, e.g., Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035,
1074-77 (1997).
57. William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State Debts in the
184o's, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 259, 269-70 (1996).
58. See Kordana, supra note 56, at 1074-77. Wenatchee, Washington, for example, is doing
everything it can to avoid defaulting on loans it took out to finance the construction and
maintenance of a mid-size arena. Ken Belson, Company's Arenas Leave Cities with Big
Problems, N.Y. TIMEs, May 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2o1/os/17/sports/a-companys
-small-town-arenas-leave-cities-with-big-problems.html?pagewanted= all.
5g. Kordana, supra note 56, at 1072-84.
6o. Compare Gillette, supra note 27, at 1261 (arguing that creditors enhance democratic
responsiveness), with Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Rule by Rentiers, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2oll/o6/io/opinion/lokrugman.html (arguing that interest-group




present provision of public services. Short of a default, however, the increased
costs associated with a credit downgrade are unlikely to excite sustained public
attention.6' Long-term debt presents a classic public choice dilemma. Interest
payments are spread over time and across a large class of taxpayers. There is
little incentive for any one taxpayer or even a group of taxpayers to expend
political energy to contest the marginal increase.
Potential defaults or bankruptcies arguably raise different concerns, as a
default is highly visible, tends to embarrass current public officials, and often
has immediate fiscal repercussions. That being said, the mechanism for
translating bad credit into political cost is still quite imperfect. Often, the
public officials who pay the political costs of a default are not the ones
responsible for the fiscal policies that led to it. And if defaulting cities or states
can get back into the credit markets relatively quickly, the long-term political
effects of a default will be relatively muted.
Of course, none of this addresses the political morality of the debt market's
influence. Even if they are willing and able, should cities and states respond to
market signals, particularly at the stage of near-default? When faced with a
decision to protect bondholders or citizens, it may be entirely appropriate for a
public official to choose the latter over the former. Democratic theory may in
fact demand such a preference if the short-term consequences of default are not
much more severe than the short-term consequences of massive budget cuts.
This may seem unfair to the bondholders, but, as Kevin Kordana has argued,
the risk of default is built into the price of their investment, and they are in a
better position than citizens to bear it.62 Moreover, to the extent that the bulk
of bondholders are not citizens, they can raise no democratic objection to the
decision. This tradeoff has been raised in the international arena, as some have
questioned whether the austerity demands induced by creditors are worth it.6 ,
States and localities may be wondering the same thing.
Ill. OF BAILOUTS AND BANKRUPTCY
The disciplining approach to state and local debt tends to reflect the view
that states and cities are relatively incompetent to manage their fiscal affairs
and highly likely to impose costs on other jurisdictions or future generations.
The current debate about bailouts and bankruptcy raises each of these themes,
61. But see Dash, supra note 13 (discussing U.S. debt downgrade).
62. Kordana, supra note 56, at 1097-99.
63. Mark Weisbrot, Op-Ed., Why Greece Should Reject the Euro, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2uoi/os/io/opinion/loweisbrot.html.
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for it reprises the long-running concerns about the efficacy of state and local
democracy. Those concerns are predictably cyclical. After an economic crisis,
institutional reformers shift power: from local governments to state
legislatures, from legislatures to the people, or from politically accountable
actors to politically insulated ones. But those institutional reforms are often
found to be unsatisfactory, after which power is often shifted again in the
ongoing quest for an institutional solution.
This cycle of centralization and decentralization is animated first by the
myth of mismanagement- the assumption that, without oversight, states and
cities will manage themselves into default. But this skepticism of local
competence is not warranted. Even during the heyday of the urban machines in
the nineteenth century, as Jon Teaford has persuasively argued, the perception
that cities were abysmally managed was unsupported by the facts .' The
nineteenth century arguably witnessed the worst of state and municipal
corruption. But it was also a time when the great industrial cities managed
phenomenal growth rates and produced significant advances in public health
and welfare. Even then (as now) municipal and state bonds were viewed as
conservative investments. That is because municipal and state defaults are
extremely rare and certainly less prevalent than bond defaults by
corporations.
That is not to say that mismanagement does not occur -the pathologies of
the state and local budgeting process are well known. But the solutions to
those pathologies have always been unsatisfying. Thus, almost immediately
after the nineteenth-century debt crisis led to a restriction of city powers,
institutional reformers initiated home-rule movements to protect local
autonomy-a reflection of their dissatisfaction with state legislatures' fiscal
intermeddling." Similarly, the judicial avoidance of debt limitations and the
dilution of public purpose requirements over the last eighty years reflect a
64. Schragger, supra note 43, at 1865-74.
65. JON C. TEAFORD, THE UNHERALDED TRIUMPH: CITY GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1900,
at 306 (1984) ("The moral image of city government remained bleak even while the
municipal ledgers told a different story.").
66. Paul Sullivan, The Risks and Returns of Municipal Bonds, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 9, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/20lo/o4/1o/your-money/lowealth.html ("The reality is that
municipal bonds have a historically minuscule default rate."); see also Joel Seligman, The
Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities
Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 699 (1995) (noting that between 1983 and 1988 the
municipal bond default rate was 0.7%, while the corporate bond default rate was 1.1%).
67. See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise, Harrisburg Finds Itself in Uncharted Financial Waters, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.Com/2o11/o7/21/us/21harrisburg.html.




political consensus that constitutional entrenchment makes for poor fiscal
policymaking."' More recent movements to remove tax and spending
limitations in state constitutions reflect the same dissatisfaction. The current
conversation about bailouts and bankruptcy is thus only the most recent
iteration of a long-running debate. And the major themes again are local
mismanagement and distrust of the local and state political processes.
The allergy to bailouts encompasses both themes, as the main concern of
those who oppose bailouts is that they generate moral hazard. The
conventional story is that bailing out cash-strapped states and cities fails to
punish them for their profligacy. 7o But the moral hazard objection to bailouts is
likely overstated. First, as was already noted, states and cities tend to pay their
debts even in the absence of formal coercion. There is no real mechanism to
"foreclose" on defaulting governments or force them into bankruptcy, and it is
not possible to "liquidate" a state or effectively attach municipal or state
property. Even after governments have waived any available immunities,
creditors' remedies are extremely limited. If moral hazard were such a pervasive
problem, we would expect much more opportunistic behavior and-more
importantly- much less lending to governmental entities." But we do not see
either. The evidence clearly shows that lenders continue to lend and
governments continue to pay back their debts "in spite of the lack of any severe
or coordinated debtor punishment."7
Second, the concern that a bailout will incentivize opportunistic behavior
seems misplaced when local, state, and federal finances are already so
intertwined. States and cities are not even remotely fiscally autonomous and
certainly not autonomous in the way that idealized accounts of fiscal federalism
presume. Intergovernmental transfers and direct federal outlays to state and
local governments and to state and local residents are the norm in our
federalism." Those transfers are so significant as to make the worry about a
one-time bailout seem odd. The federal government is already the primary
fiscal backstop for individual citizens. It is not clear why we would see an
increase in strategic behavior by states and localities if that fiscal intervention
took the form of a bailout.
69. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 910-14.
70. See Kordana, supra note 56, at 1068-69.
71. See id. at 1067-69.
72. Id. at 1085.
73. See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FEDERAL AID TO STATES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 (2010),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2olopubs/fas-o9.pdf.
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Moreover, the no-bailout view implicitly assumes that higher-level
governments have little to no responsibility for local fiscal difficulties. But the
federal government encourages states and municipalities to take on debt by
providing a tax exemption for municipal bond interest. At the same time,
federal and state policies shift costs downward via unfunded mandates or tax
cuts -both of which require states and localities to assume a greater share of
the fiscal burden. It stands to reason that state and federal officials have little
incentive not to impose funding obligations on lower-level governments unless
they have to take responsibility on the back end for the fiscal stresses they
cause.
Again, a bailout is not particularly remarkable if the fiscal health of states
and localities is already dependent on and vulnerable to central government
fiscal decisions. Indeed, the intertwined nature of national, state, and local
finances means that solving a political process problem at one level of
government might contribute to a different problem at another level of
government. Elected officials have incentives to impose political externalities
downward. If we treat local governments as fiscally autonomous in order to
force them to make hard choices, other political actors in the system will be
inclined to shift as many of those choices onto them as they can.75 And the last
one holding the bag may be the least able to lift it.
A different objection to bailouts is that the moral hazard to be avoided is on
the lending side, as investors anticipating a bailout will be too aggressive in
extending credit. But the uncertainty of the rescue and its terms may be
enough to prevent overlending. The few bailouts of cities that have occurred
have been accompanied by fairly severe terms - terms that can include some
pain for creditors. Recall that despite President Gerald Ford's initial objection
(as memorialized in the famous headline: "Ford to City: Drop Dead")7 New
York City did in fact receive $2.3 billion in short-term loans from the federal
74. The no-bailout position also implicitly assumes a contestable distribution of fiscal
responsibilities between the local, state, and federal governments.
75. One recent example took place in New York, where the state legislature passed a property
tax cap for localities. The cap diminishes the ability of local governments to raise revenue
without corresponding funding from the state to make up the difference. See Thomas
Kaplan, Senate Passes Cuomo's Property-Tax Cap, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 31, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.coM/2o1/o2/ol/nyregion/oicap.html.
76. Frank Van Riper, Ford to City: Drop Dead, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 30, 1975, at 1; see also
Richard Pdrez-Pefia, Hugh L. Carey, Who Led Fiscal Rescue of New York City, Is Dead at 92,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/201/o8/o8/nyregion/hugh-carey-who





government to prevent the City from defaulting in 1975." No one would
contend that New York's bailout signaled that investors should increase their
exposure to city debt; in fact, the large banks holding the bulk of New York's
notes had to accept less favorable repayment terms. Nor did the bailout induce
cities and states to go on a spending spree, in part because its terms were
suitably stringent, 7 but also because local elected officials are not inclined to
lead their communities up to the edge of default.
The more plausible objection to bailouts is a democratic one. When the
fiscal choices made by one state or city affect the fiscal health of other states or
cities, there must be some democratic justification. Assuming that higher-level
governments are not contributors to local fiscal stress (and, as I have said, that
is questionable), poorly run cities or states should not impose costs on better-
run cities and states. That a city or state default threatens contagion-the
collapse of the national credit markets-perhaps makes bailouts inevitable but
democratically troubling.
This is not a unique problem, however. The federal government has not
only injected cash into private enterprises to save the automobile, banking, and
mortgage industries, but has in the past injected cash to stabilize foreign
sovereigns.7 ' The standard by which we judge the normative attractiveness of
state and local bailouts should not be any higher. Certainly any bailout terms
would be set by Congress, which, for all its flaws, is likely to demand
something substantial in return. The existing institutional constraints thus
seem well suited to minimize the democratic objection to the bailout itself.so
The question is whether Congress should have additional power to regulate the
fiscal decisions of states as a way of preempting bailouts in the future. That
kind of intervention is very troubling to those who worry about state
sovereignty.
77. See Roger Dunstan, Overview of New York City's Fiscal Crisis, 3 CAL. RESEARCH BuREAu
NOTE, no. 1, at 1, 5-6 (1995), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/95/notes/V3Nl.pdf;
Prez-Pefia, supra note 76.
78. For a description of the terms of the New York City bailout, see Dunstan, supra note 77, at
5-6.
79. Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L.
REv. 1627, 1638 (2oo6) (discussing the "$so billion U.S.-led rescue package" of Mexico).
so. indeed, a more significant concern from the perspective of democratic theory is that the
conditions of assistance will be so onerous as to undermine local self-government. Michigan
residents have recently filed a lawsuit claiming that their underlying right to local self-
government is being violated by the governor's imposition of emergency managers on
fiscally strapped local governments. See Monica Davey, Michigan Residents Sue over Law on
Emergency Management of Struggling Cities, N.Y. TimEs, June 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/o6/23/us/23michigan.html.
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Scholars have naturally looked to bankruptcy for a solution."' At the outset,
it is questionable whether the fiscal health of state and local governments is so
poor that they need an opportunity to file for bankruptcy. Some commentators
have pointed out that state and local debt remains within the historical ranges
of the last three decades. The same is true for interest payments as a fraction of
state and local spending: roughly 4% of state and local spending today goes
toward interest on debt, which is in line with the average rate in the 1970s and
early 198os and is much less than the 6.5% state and local governments were
devoting to interest payments in 1987.8'
Assuming states and local governments are in near-default positions,
however, there is still reason to doubt the efficacy of the bankruptcy option. To
the extent that we worry about moral hazard (and as I have said, there are
reasons to believe that concern is overblown), bankruptcy does not solve it - at
least on the debtor's side.8 ' Like bailouts, bankruptcy erases debt without
making a distinction between poor management and bad luck. The advantage
of bankruptcy, according to those who advocate it, seems to be that it is not a
bailout and that it can force fiscal decisions that would be politically
unpalatable otherwise.*
The resort to bankruptcy replays the institutional move embodied in the
fiscal constitution: shift decisionmaking up the scale of government. In this
case, a federal bankruptcy judge would have some authority to reorganize city
or state debt at the stage of near-default. Of course, the bankruptcy option at
the back end will create incentives on the front end. Thus, depending on the
structure of the imagined bankruptcy law, bankruptcy may be an indirect way
for Congress (through judges) to regulate state and local fiscal practices. Or
the bankruptcy option will shift power within the state, possibly from the
legislature to the governor, depending on who is authorized to seek bankruptcy
81. See Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State 'Bankruptcy,' 59 UCLA L. REV.
(forthcoming Dec. 2011) (stating that "bankruptcy law is an obvious mechanism of debt
relief").
82. Lay & McNichol, supra note 47, at 9-10. But see Blood on the Table, Money in the Bank,
ECONOMIST, July 7, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/8928863.
83. Kordana, supra note 56, at io85.
84. Skeel, Give States a Way To Go Bankrupt, supra note 3; Skeel, States ofBankruptcy, supra note 3.
85. Advocates of a federal law of state bankruptcy are unabashed about this intention. See Skeel,
States of Bankruptcy, supra note 3, at 9-18 (describing how a federal bankruptcy law would





protection for the state, who will negotiate its terms, and what kinds of
legislative authorization might be required. 86
Like other institutional innovations, however, it is likely that the
bankruptcy option will be unsatisfying. Currently, the Bankruptcy Code seems
to be of limited use. Cities can already access bankruptcy if their states allow,
but very few cities do so.17 Perhaps this is because the Code does not
contemplate the kinds of reorganizations that are possible on the private side
and thus does not help cities grapple with their underlying economic woes. For
example, in many cases, redrawing municipal boundaries or reconfiguring the
municipalities' status would be advisable. Disincorporation would allow
fiscally-strapped cities to become part of a larger taxing entity -in most cases,
the surrounding county." But the Code does not permit judges to order such
involuntary dissolutions, nor would it appear to be consistent with local
autonomy to permit them to do so.8, State receiverships for municipal debt
crises may thus be more appropriate, as the state has the ability (if not the will)
to address the structural harms that lead to local fiscal crises in the first place.9 o
As for states, the imposition of a federal judicial solution is also likely to
have limited effect." As an initial matter, it should be noted that treating the
state as a monolithic debtor is misleading. State agencies, state pension funds,
local governments, and state and local public authorities all issue different
forms of debt, some of which are formally backed by the state and many of
86. See id. at 30 (proposing that Congress vest the authority to propose a restructuring plan
directly in the governor).
87. Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J.
ON REG. 351, 359 (2010).
88. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1919768.
89. Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction
to Municipal Bankruptcy, 6o U. CHI. L. REv. 425, 4 81-8 5 (1993).
go. See Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 633 (2oo8). As noted above, the receivership option raises its own democratic concerns.
See Davey, supra note 8o.
91. See Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121 YALE L.J.
888, 896 (2012) ("[B]ankruptcy's likely contributions are limited and often hinge on a set of
questionable assumptions."); Richard Hynes, State Default and Synthetic Bankruptcy (Dec.
7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with author) (noting that states "don't need
to file for protection under the bankruptcy code to realize most of the benefits of
'bankruptcy'-a single proceeding that binds all creditors"). But see Schwarcz, supra note 81
(advocating a minimalist approach to state bankruptcy); Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra
note 3.
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which are not." State bankruptcy proposals tend not to appreciate these
differences. More importantly, a federal law of state bankruptcy will have little
traction unless the powers of the bankruptcy judge are well beyond what
principles of federalism would seem to allow. No state can be forced into
bankruptcy, and it is unlikely a state would volunteer with the knowledge that
a judge could force legislative action. In any case, few commentators believe
that bankruptcy courts should be empowered to order states to raises taxes or
repudiate or amend their constitutions." Even if a judge could do so, it is not
at all clear that a state would comply."4 A detailed federal bankruptcy law that
dictates the terms of state restructuring would constitute a serious alteration of
the federal-state relationship.
Allowing Congress or an unelected judge to make state-level fiscal decisions
at the bankruptcy stage will not be particularly effective either. Bankruptcy will
not exercise much disciplinary force on creditors unless bankruptcy is worse
than a default-a possibility that is already calculated into creditors'
investments. It will also not exercise much disciplinary force on cities and
states unless Congress or bankruptcy courts establish fairly interventionist
guidelines. And those guidelines will be as much subject to politics, judicial
manipulation, and special interest pleading as the states' fiscal constitutions
have been. Like the institutional reforms that came before it, bankruptcy is a
means of shifting institutional scales to accomplish substantive political ends.
The politicians know this. As recent debates illustrate, policymakers
understand that the bankruptcy question is really about the relative sanctity of
existing and future state employee benefits and pension obligations.95
92. See Hynes, supra note 91, for this point.
93. The same political and constitutional concerns that limit bankruptcy judges in municipal
bankruptcy filings would almost certainly limit bankruptcy judges in state bankruptcy
filings. Thus, a bankruptcy judge would likely be unable to regulate state expenditures, to
allow creditors to seize public or private property within the state, or to allow creditors to
get a lien on future state taxes or revenues. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 89, at 429-45.
It is also doubtful that a federal bankruptcy judge could order states to levy new taxes. Cf
Kordana, supra note 56, at 1096-1106 (arguing that allowing such an order would also be
inefficient).
94. It is unlikely states would be eager to enroll in a federal bankruptcy program. A majority of
governors currently opposes such a plan. See Press Release, Nat'l Governors Ass'n, NGA
Statement Regarding Bankruptcy Proposals for States (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.nga.org/
cms/home/news-roon/news-releases/page_2011/co2-content/main-content-list/nga-statement
-regarding-bankrupt.html.
95. McMahon, supra note 3; see also Mary Williams Walsh & Abby Goodnough, A Small
City's Depleted Pension Fund Rattles Rhode Island, N.Y. TmEs, July 11, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/20u/o 7/12/business/central-falls-ri-faces-bankruptcy-over-pension




It is quite difficult on democratic grounds to justify allowing a judge to
impose particular fiscal ends unless the political pathologies of the local and
state budgeting process are so wide and deep that coercion outside elective
politics is required. And thus we return to the distrust of local, representative
democracy. If it is true that cities and states will invariably engage in giveaways
to vested interests and rarely take into account future generations, then our
ongoing efforts to design institutional checks on their authority would be
warranted-even if that effort is likely to fail.
But I do not see an inevitable political failure. Local, state, and national
politics are characterized by an almost obsessive concern with excessive
spending and debt; elections are won and lost on the electorate's assessment of
the relative fiscal probity of the candidates. And voters, like creditors, are
usually able to tell the difference between fiscal irresponsibility and economic
bad luck, punishing the former more than the latter."
Within this context, bankruptcy may provide strategic benefits for
particular political actors. For example, state and city officials may use the
threat of bankruptcy as a tool in their negotiations with public sector unions,9 7
or as a way of inducing higher level governments to provide aid; city officials
may seek bankruptcy protection as a means to prevent a hostile state
takeover.' But institutionalized debt relief of whatever kind still leaves
untouched the existing fiscal regime and the underlying structures that have
led to fiscal distress in the first place.99 Better to revisit the structural defects in
the state's fiscal constitution, both on the spending and the revenue sides.
Better yet to debate the merits of bailouts, with all their political and fiscal
Adam Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy 36-38 (Georgetown Univ. Law
Ctr. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11-127, 2011),
http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1898775.
g6. Cf Kordana, supra note 56, at 1077 (describing how creditors can differentiate between
opportunistic and nonopportunistic behavior).
97. Recent court decisions have suggested that cities and states may no longer need to threaten
bankruptcy to lower pensions, as governments in Colorado and Minnesota legally reduced
pensions without filing for bankruptcy. Mary Williams Walsh, Two Rulings Find Cuts in
Public Pensions Permissible, N.Y. TimEs, June 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/07/01/business/olpension.html.
g8. For a sympathetic account of one city's use of bankruptcy in this way, see Dorothy A.
Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a Case Study in
Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, ii BANKR. DEv. J. 625, 626 (1995). For a skeptical account, see
Gillette, supra note 23. Gillette's proposal to permit bankruptcy judges to impose tax
increases so as to "neutralize the strategic behavior of local officials," id. at i, has been
rejected by Kordana, supra note 56, at 1o96-1o6.
gg. See Levitin, supra note 95, at 3-4.
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implications.'00 Gerald Ford claimed that his initial opposition to bailing out
New York City cost him the presidential election.' More recently, national
politicians have paid a political price for supporting bailouts associated with
the Troubled Asset Relief Program. 0 2 That there are political costs and
benefits is as it should be.
CONCLUSION
Institutional designers continue to seek mechanisms that will constrain
fiscal politics, be they constitutions or markets. The effort is unlikely to bear
fruit. First, there is the problem of boom and bust. Public-side investments can
and do go bad, especially when they coincide with a downturn in the business
cycle. And large-scale changes in the economy will affect government finances
in ways that have little to do with irresponsible spending. The modern social
welfare state seeks to ameliorate booms and busts with monetary policy,
regulation of finance, large-scale tax and transfer programs, and nationwide
social insurance. Subnational governments do not have these kinds of tools at
their disposal, and thus the central government has an important role to play in
assisting those governments.
Second, while institutional reforms will shift political power among and
between state and local actors, they ultimately do not depoliticize tax and
spending choices. The fiscal discipline of constitutional constraints can only
work if state constitutional politics is different in kind from state fiscal politics.
But it is not. And the market can only work if its signals are accurate and states
and localities have the will and capacity to respond to those signals. None of
these conditions holds to a significant degree. Institutional reforms seem only
to exacerbate existing political pathologies, and the constraints adopted in the
shadow of past crises are not well-matched to present challenges. Indeed, the
loo. Anna Gelpern prefers "bailouts with strings" rather than bankruptcy for states. See Gelpern,
supra note 91, at 940; cf Adam Levitin, In Defense ofBailouts, 99 GEo. L.J. 435, 442-43, 501-07
(2011) (arguing that bailouts are inevitable and that they should be structured to maximize
political accountability).
lo. Andy Bechtel, Memorable Headlines: Ford to City: Drop Dead, EDITOR'S DESK (Apr. 6, 2oo9,
10:22 AM), http://editdesk.wordpress.com/2oo9/o4/o6/ford-drop-dead-headline.
102. Seth E. Masket & Steven Greene, When One Vote Matters: The Electoral Impact of Roll





experience of states with balanced budget requirements is a cautionary tale for
those who have renewed the call for constitutional reform at the federal level.10 3
This should lead us to think about the idea of fiscal discipline differently. I
have argued that an approach to the behavior of subnational territorial
jurisdictions that assumes "discipline" is possible is incorrect and misguided.
That being said, I began this Essay with the assumption that constraining
elected officials so that they act consistently with the public good is the
problem to be solved. But this raises a question about ends. What constitutes
"fiscal discipline" is really a debate about what the public good requires. For
some, all state and local redistributive spending is by definition "undisciplined":
taxing and spending should mimic what a private market in analogous goods
would produce. For others, states and localities have a significant role to play in
producing public goods and ameliorating inequality.
I do not resolve that debate here. It is enough to point out that it is
contested and contestable. What is evident from the history of the fiscal
constitution, however, is that political actors will deploy institutional reform as
a means of pursuing substantive political ends. The institutionalist's conceit is
that certain forms of constitutional entrenchment can shape political choices
toward some consensus goal. 1 4 But this is likely too optimistic a story. The
consensus goal is elusive and the view that particular institutions have a
constraining effect relies on a distinction between law and politics that has
been repeatedly discredited.
As for the market, I began this Essay by noting the fraught relationship
between democracy and debt, sovereignty and fiscal restraint. Capital markets
are obviously useful tools for governments. But democratic theory favors
citizens over bondholders. Sometimes their respective interests will coincide;
other times they will not. How to ensure public, democratic rule when capital
is highly mobile is a question that is beyond the scope of this Essay."os
Nevertheless, it is important to remember not to confuse access to the debt
103. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Republicans Set Sights on Balanced Budget Amendment, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.con/2ol/o8/os/us/politics/05budget.html; see also BRIFFAULT,
supra note 38, at 63-65 (criticizing balanced budget proposals).
104. Cf John Joseph Wallis & Barry R. Weingast, Dysfunctional or Optimal Institutions?: State
Debt Limitations, the Structure of State and Local Governments, and the Finance of American
Infrastructure, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY
331, 334 (Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth A. Graddy & Howell E. Jackson eds., 2008) ("The
institutional structure [of U.S. state and local governments] is not perfect, but nonetheless,
on balance, it is quite positive. ... State and local governments issue huge amounts of debt
each year, and yet very few fail to make good on their bonds.").
1os. I address this question more directly in Schragger, supra note 43.
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markets with democratic legitimacy. When the bond market becomes a despot,
we have lost the balance between democracy and debt.
While we know that representative institutions at the state and local level
are far from perfect, fiscal responsibility has been more the norm than the
exception. The reason cities and states have paid their debts during normal
economic times is not because the fiscal constitution or the market have
prevented profligacy but rather because we have a mature, decentralized
political system that holds elected officials accountable more often than is
sometimes assumed. Local and state taxpayers are attentive to tax and spending
decisions. Moreover, in the post-New Deal state, large-scale infrastructure and
social insurance spending are now the province of the federal government, a
government that has the capacity to engage in monetary policy. These features
of our current federalism have been in place for some time. To the extent that
there are "solutions" to state and local debt crises, they already exist.
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